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The many decisions people make about what to pay attention to online shape the spread of
information in online social networks. Due to the constraints of available time and cognitive re-
sources, the ease of discovery strongly impacts how people allocate their attention to social media
content. As a consequence, the position of information in an individual’s social feed, as well as
explicit social signals about its popularity, determine whether it will be seen, and the likelihood
that it will be shared with followers. Accounting for these cognitive limits simplifies mechanics of
information diffusion in online social networks and explains puzzling empirical observations: (i) in-
formation generally fails to spread in social media and (ii) highly connected people are less likely to
re-share information. Studies of information diffusion on different social media platforms reviewed
here suggest that the interplay between human cognitive limits and network structure differentiates
the spread of information from other social contagions, such as the spread of a virus through a
population.
I. INTRODUCTION
The spread of information in online social networks is
often likened to the spread of a contagious disease. Ac-
cording to this analogy, information—whether a trending
topic, a news story, a song, or a video—behaves much
like a virus, “infecting” individuals, who then “expose”
their naive followers by mentioning the topic, sharing the
video, or recommending the news story, etc. These fol-
lowers may, in turn, become “infected” by sharing the
information, “exposing” their own followers, and so on.
If each person “infects” at least one other person, infor-
mation will keep spreading on the network, resulting in
a “viral” outbreak, similar to how a spreading virus can
create an epidemic that sickens a large portion of the
population. The analogy between the spread of a disease
and information is the basis of computational methods
that attempt to amplify the spread of information in net-
works by identifying influential “superspreaders” [1–5],
and those that make inferences about the network from
observations of how information spreads on it [6–10].
One of the simplest and most widely used models of
the spread of epidemics in networks is the Independent
Cascade Model (ICM) [1, 6, 11–13]. It describes a pro-
cess wherein each exposure of a healthy but susceptible
individual to a disease by an infected friend results in
an independent chance of disease transmission: the more
infected friends an individual has, the more likely he or
she is to become infected. The model predicts the size of
an outbreak (number of individuals infected) in any net-
work for a given value of disease transmissibility (i.e.,
how easily the disease is transmitted upon exposure).
Figure 1 shows the size of outbreaks simulated using the
ICM on a social media follower graph (red dots) [14]. The
black symbols give the size of simulated outbreaks on a
randomly-generated graph with the same degree distri-
bution as the follower graph. The simulated outbreaks
are close in size to the theoretically predicted values [15],
given by the golden line in Fig. 1. There exists a critical
value of transmissibility—the epidemic threshold [16]—
FIG. 1. Size of simulated outbreaks on a real-world and ran-
dom graphs as a function of transmissibility. Contagions are
simulated using the independent cascade model (ICM) on the
follower graph of the Digg social news platform (red dots)
and a random graph with the same degree distribution (black
crosses). The golden line gives theoretically predicted out-
break sizes.
below which the contagion dies out, but above which it
spreads to a finite portion of the network. The epidemic
threshold depends only on structural properties of the
network, and not the details of the disease or its transmis-
sibility [17]: specifically, the epidemic threshold is given
by the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency
matrix representing the network [16, 18]. Note that even
above the epidemic threshold, contagions starting in iso-
lated corners of the network may die out. However, in
general, the higher the transmissibility, the farther the
contagion spreads, reaching a non-negligible fraction of
the network above the epidemic threshold, for example,
10%, 20%, etc. of the network.
How well does the social contagion analogy hold for
social media? In this review of empirical studies of infor-
mation diffusion in social media, I first present evidence
that information fails to spread widely in online social
networks. The vast majority of outbreaks are very small
(see Fig. 2), in stark contrast to the predictions of the epi-
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2demic model. To explain these findings, I present stud-
ies examining the mechanisms of information diffusion,
specifically how people respond to multiple exposures to
information. The key finding of these studies—that cen-
tral individuals in an online social network are less sus-
ceptible to becoming “infected”—is sufficient to explain
why social contagions fail to propagate. The studies also
link the reduced susceptibility of central individuals to
information overload and human reliance on cognitive
heuristics to compensate for the brain’s limited capacity
to process information. Accounting for how people use
cognitive heuristics to decide what information to pay
attention to in social media dramatically simplifies dy-
namics of social contagion and allows for more accurate
predictions of how far information will spread online.
II. SIZE OF SOCIAL CONTAGIONS
Empirical studies of information spread in social me-
dia have failed to observe outbreaks as large as those
predicted by the independent cascade model [14, 19,
20]. This review focuses on two widely-studied social
platforms—Twitter and Digg—although similar behav-
iors were observed in a variety of other social plat-
forms [19]. Twitter, a popular microblogging platform,
allows registered users to broadcast short messages, or
“tweets.” These messages may contain URLs or descrip-
tive labels, known as hashtags. In addition to composing
original tweets, users can re-share, or “retweet,” mes-
sages posted by others. In contrast to Twitter, Digg fo-
cuses solely on news. Digg users submit URLs to news
stories they find on the web and vote for, i.e., “digg,” sto-
ries submitted by others. Both platforms include a social
networking component: users can subscribe to the feeds
of other users to see the tweets those users posted (on
Twitter) or the news stories they submitted or voted for
(on Digg). The follow relationship is asymmetric; hence,
we refer to the subscribing users as followers, and the
users they subscribe to as their friends (or followees).
To measure the size of outbreaks on Twitter, re-
searchers used URLs to external web content embedded
in tweets as unique markers of information [21]. They
tracked these URLs as users shared or retweeted the mes-
sages with their followers. A similar strategy was used
to track each news story on Digg. Thus, the number of
times a message containing a URL was retweeted or a
news story was “dugg” in their respective networks gave
an estimate of the outbreak size in that network.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of outbreak sizes on
the Twitter and Digg social platforms. Note that out-
breaks have a long-tailed distribution, except for a bump
on Digg that corresponds to promoted stories. When
a newly submitted story accumulated enough votes, it
was promoted to Digg’s front page, where it was visible
to everyone, not only to followers of voters [22]. The
higher visibility of stories on the front page gave them
a popularity boost, resulting in log-normally distributed
(a)Digg
(b)Twitter
FIG. 2. Size of outbreaks in social media. Empirical mea-
surements of the size of contagious outbreaks in social media
sites (a) Digg and (b) Twitter. The x-axis represents the
size of outbreak in terms of the number of people who dugg
or retweeted specific information, and y-axis reports the fre-
quency of events of that size.
popularity. However, even the most popular stories did
not penetrate very far. Only one story, about Michael
Jackson’s death, could be said to have reached “viral”
proportions, i.e., reaching a non-negligible fraction of ac-
tive Digg users (in this case, about 5%). The next most
popular story reached fewer than 2% of Digg voters, and
the vast majority of front page stories reached fewer than
0.1% of the voters. Similarly, very few of the outbreaks
on Twitter reached more than 10,000 users, or less than
2% of the active user population. These findings are in
line with other studies, including by Goel et al. [19], who
analyzed seven online social networks, ranging from com-
munication platforms to networked games, to reach the
same conclusion: the vast majority of outbreaks in online
social networks are small and terminate within one step
of the source of information.
3III. MECHANICS OF CONTAGION:
EXPOSURE RESPONSE
The observations above present a puzzle: what stops
information from spreading widely on social media? And
why is outbreak size so much smaller than predicted by
the independent cascade model? A number of hypotheses
could potentially explain the empirical findings:
Subcriticality: The vast majority of information spread
is sub-critical, with transmissibility below the epi-
demic threshold. As a result, information is un-
likely to spread upon exposure, and can be con-
sidered uninteresting. This hypothesis is easy to
dismiss, since it is difficult to imagine that all the
information shared on many different social media
platforms is uninteresting.
Load balancing: Social media users may modulate
transmissibility of information to prevent too many
pieces of information from spreading and creating
information overload. This hypothesis is difficult
to evaluate, though it is not very credible, since
such wide-scale coordination would be difficult to
achieve. Moreover, it would require users to cor-
rectly estimate the popularity of different pieces of
information in their local neighborhood, a measure-
ment that is easily skewed in networks [23].
Novelty decay: Transmissibility of information could
diminish over time as information loses novelty. A
study [24] explicitly addressed this hypothesis, and
found that the probability to retweet information
on Twitter does not depend on its absolute age,
but only the time it first appeared in a user’s social
feed.
Network structure: Although it is conceivable that
network structure (e.g., clustering or communities)
could limit the spread of information, this hypoth-
esis was ruled out [14]. As can be seen in Figure 1,
the structure of the actual Digg follower graph
somewhat reduces the size of outbreaks, but not
nearly enough to explain empirical observations.
Contagion mechanism: The decisions people make to
vote for a story on Digg or retweet a URL on Twit-
ter, once their friends have shared, it could differ
substantially from the ICM. These differences could
prevent information from spreading [14].
To characterize the mechanisms of contagion, re-
searchers use the “exposure response function.” Since
a person may be exposed to some information (or dis-
ease) by several friends, exposure response function gives
the probability of an infection as a function of the num-
ber of exposures. Under the independent cascade model,
infection probability rises monotonically with the num-
ber of infected friends as: pICM(infection|k exposures) =
1− (1−µ)k, where µ is the transmissibility. Using social
(a)Digg
(b)Twitter
FIG. 3. The exposure response function for social media users.
The figures report the probability (averaged over all users)
to respond to information, i.e., (a) to digg a news story or
(b) retweet a URL, as a function of number of friends who
previously did so.
media data, researchers empirically measured the expo-
sure response function for Twitter and Digg users. To do
this, they found all users who became “infected” (e.g.,
retweeted a URL [24] or adopted a hashtag [25] on Twit-
ter, or “dugg” a story on Digg [14]) after k of their friends
(i.e., the users he or she follows) became “infected.” The
exposure response function is the ratio of the number of
users who became “infected” to the number who did not
become “infected” for different values of k.
Figure 3 shows the exposure response functions for
Digg and Twitter, averaged over all users. The shape
and magnitude of the exposure response functions are
fundamentally different from that of the ICM. The form
of the exposure response indicates that while initial ex-
posures increase infection probability, additional expo-
sures suppress new infections. According to Romero et
al. [25], such response is suggestive of complex contagion,
another popular model for describing social contagions,
where “infection” does not occur until exposure by some
specified fraction of friends [26–29].
Does the suppressed response to multiple exposures
inhibit the spread of information online? Ver Steeg et
4FIG. 4. Size of simulated outbreaks on Digg as a function
of transmissibility. Simulations of social contagion on the
Digg follower graph (black crosses) using suppressed exposure
response function suggested by Fig. 3(a). Actual outbreaks
on Digg are shown as red dots, while theoretically predicted
(gold) line is the same as in Fig. 1. Suppressed response to
repeated exposures vastly decreases the size of outbreaks as
compared to prediction of the ICM (Fig. 1).
al. [14] simulated the spread of social contagions on the
Digg follower graph with the suppressed exposure re-
sponse function suggested by Fig. 3(a). In the simu-
lation, exposure response was approximated as follows.
If a node had any infected friends, it became infected
with probability µ. However, if it did not get infected
(with probability 1 − µ), it was forever immune to new
infections. Figure 4 shows the size of the resulting out-
breaks (red dots) as a function of transmissibility µ. The
outbreaks are an order of magnitude smaller than those
predicted by the independent cascade model, and in line
with empirically observed outbreaks (black crosses). This
suggests that online contagions fail to spread due to the
reduced susceptibility of social media users to multiple
exposures.
IV. LIMITED ATTENTION AND COGNITIVE
HEURISTICS
Why don’t social media users respond to multiple ex-
posures to information? In distinction to viral infection,
social media users must actively seek out information and
decide to share it before becoming “infected.” The enor-
mous flux of information on social media often saturates
human ability to process information [30]. Faced with
an over-abundance of stimuli, humans evolved mecha-
nisms to parsimoniously direct their attention to the
most salient stimuli. What is salient depends on con-
text: color, contrast, and motion help guide visual at-
tention to important features of the environment, such
as a predator. Social stimuli are also salient, as they aid
coordination and help people avoid conflict. A variety of
other cognitive heuristics are used to quickly (and uncon-
sciously) focus attention on salient information [31, 32].
In the context of social media, information that appears
at the top of the web page or user’s social feed is salient.
As a result of this cognitive heuristic, known as “position
bias” [33], people pay more attention to items at the top
of a list than those in lower positions. Social influence
bias, communicated through social signals, helps direct
attention to online content that has been liked, shared or
approved by many others [34, 35].
FIG. 5. Position bias. The relative decrease in recommen-
dations received by items at different position within a list,
compared to expected recommendations. Items in top po-
sitions (1–5) receive four to five times as much attention as
items in lower positions (50–75). The rise near the end of the
list is created by people who start inspecting the list from the
end.
Cognitive heuristics interact with how a web site dis-
plays information to users to alter the dynamics of so-
cial contagion. Twitter presents friends’ messages in a
user’s feed as a chronologically ordered queue, with the
most recently tweeted messages at the top. (Similarly,
Digg orders news stories submitted by friends in a re-
verse chronological order.) Due to position bias, a user
is more likely to see newest messages at the top of the
feed than older messages in lower positions. Researchers
conducted controlled experiments on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk to quantify position bias [36]. They presented
study participants with a list of 100 items and asked them
to recommend those they found interesting. Figure 5
shows the relative decrease in recommendations received
at each list position, compared to what the items shown
in those positions are expected to receive. Items in top
list positions (0–5) receive three to five times as much
attention as those in lower positions (40–75), purely by
virtue of being in those positions.
However, in the observational data from social media,
we do not know the feed position of a message at the time
the user responds to it. Instead, we know that its position
should be proportional to its age, i.e., time since its ar-
rival in the user’s feed, when the latter is a queue ordered
by time of item’s arrival. Figure 6 confirms the effect. It
shows the probability to digg (or retweet) an item as a
function of the time since item’s arrival. Though Twitter
5(a)Digg
(b)Twitter
FIG. 6. Time response function for social media. The prob-
ability to (a) digg a news story and (b) retweet a URL, as a
function of the time since exposure, i.e., message’s arrival in
the user’s feed. To remove the confounding effects of multi-
ple exposures, the figure only considers single exposure items.
Digg stories were only followed until promotion (the first 24
hours) during which time they were only visible to the follow-
ers. The data are smoothed using progressively wider smooth-
ing windows, as in [24].
and Digg differ substantially in their functionality and
user interface, they behave very similarly. The proba-
bility on both sites drops precipitously with time, which
suggests that social media users are far less likely to see—
and retweet—older messages in lower feed positions than
newer messages in top feed positions.
Cognitive heuristics also interact with network struc-
ture of alter the dynamics of social contagion. The visi-
bility of an item in a feed of a well-connected user (who
follows many others) decreases faster in time than the vis-
ibility of an item in the feed of a poorly-connected user
(who follows few friends). As a result, well-connected
users with more friends rarely retweet old content. This
is because these users receive many newer messages from
their multitude of friends, which quickly push a given
item further down the queue, where it is less likely to
be seen. In contrast, poorly-connected users receive few
messages, so that the visibility of an item does not decay
as quickly. This effect is evident in Figure 6, where the
probability to retweet (or digg) an item decreases faster
for well-connected users (with more than 250 friends)
than for the poorly-connected users (with fewer than 10
friends).
FIG. 7. Exposure response function for Twitter. The figure
shows the average probability to retweet some message as a
function of the number of friends who previously tweeted it
for two classes of users, separated according to the number
of friends they follow. The well-connected users with many
friends are less likely to retweet; hence, they are less suscep-
tible, than users with few friends.
The quickly decaying visibility of information in the
feeds of well-connected social media users reduces their
susceptibility to becoming “infected” by that informa-
tion. Figure 7 shows the exposure response function for
two classes of Twitter users: those with few friends and
those with many friends. The response probability of
well-connected users with many friends is much lower
compared to poorly-connected users, consistent with the
argument that they have a harder time finding specific
messages in their long feeds. Note also that both response
functions increase monotonically, in line with simple con-
tagion models, such as the ICM. The non-monotonic be-
havior observed for adoption of hashtags on Twitter [25]
and in Figure 3 does not represent complex contaction,
but is simply an artifact of averaging over heterogeneous
populations of users with different cognitive load, i.e.,
different volumes of information in their feeds. Aver-
aging the curves in Figure 7, we will observe an expo-
sure response that initially increases, since both classes
of users contribute; however, as the number of “infected”
friends increases further, only users with many friends
contribute to the response, bringing the average response
function down. This is an illustration of “heterogeneity’s
ruses” [37]: averaging over heterogeneous populations,
each with its own behavior, can produce nonsensical be-
havioral patterns. When studying social systems, one
needs to isolate the more homogeneous populations and
carry out analysis within each population [38].
6V. PREDICTING SOCIAL CONTAGIONS
Knowing how cognitive heuristics constrain user be-
havior enables us to more accurately predict social con-
tagions. To become “infected,” a user must first discover
at least one message containing the information. We ap-
proximate a message’s visibility using the time response
function, of the kind shown in Fig. 6, that gives the prob-
ability that a user with nf friends retweets or votes at a
time ∆t after the exposure [24].
To understand the dynamics of social contagion, we
must also specify how users respond to multiple expo-
sures to information. Here, the details of how the web site
presents information matter. Twitter puts each newly
retweeted item—the new exposure—at a top of the fol-
lowers’ feeds, creating a new opportunity for the follow-
ers to discover the item. Thus, if k friends tweet some
information, it will appear in a user’s feed k times in dif-
ferent positions. In contrast, Digg does not change the
news story’s relative position after a friend’s digg, but
increments the number of recommendations shown next
to the story: after k friends digg a story, it still appears
only once in the user’s feed, but with the number k next
to it. This number serves as a social signal that change
a user’s response. The effect of social signals on user’s
likelihood to become “infected” can be measured exper-
imentally [35] or estimated from observational data [39].
Putting these factors together, [39] proposed a sim-
ple model of social contagion where each exposure can
independently cause an “infection” (i.e., a retweet). In
contrast to the plain ICM, “infection” probability de-
pends on the visibility of the exposures, which is related
to the time of the exposures on Twitter or the time of
the first exposure on Digg. A social signal, if present, will
amplify “infection” probability. To validate this model,
the authors used it to forecast “infections” and compared
them to observed “infections.” Specifically, they calcu-
lated on a minute-by-minute basis the observed frequency
that a user with some number of exposures in their feed
retweeted some specific information on Twitter or dugg
a story on Digg in the subsequent 30 seconds. Then they
calculated the theoretical probability that the same user
would act in those 30 seconds, given the same exposures.
Figure 8 shows the observed vs predicted probability of
those infections, for different numbers of exposures in the
users’ feeds. For reference, perfect forecasts lie along the
y = x line. The unbiased fidelity of the proposed model
suggests that once visibility of the exposures is taken into
account, social contagion operates as a simple contagion,
i.e., with infection probability increasing monotonically
with the number of exposures. Other works incorporated
visibility into models of user behavior that account for
user interests [40] and sentiment [41] about topics, their
limited attention [42], and the multiple channels for find-
ing information, such as on Digg’s front page [22].
(a)Digg
(b)Twitter
FIG. 8. Predicting response. Observed probability to (a) digg
or (b) retweet an item as a function of predicted probability,
for different numbers of exposures to the item.
VI. DISCUSSION
The notion that networks amplify the flow of informa-
tion has ignited the imagination of researchers and pub-
lic alike. The few success stories—songs and videos that
have spread in a chain reaction from person to person
to reach millions—keep marketers searching for formulas
for creating viral campaigns. Success, however, is rare.
Empirical studies of the spread of information in online
social networks revealed that information rarely spreads
beyond the source. The search for answers as to why in-
formation fails to spread in social media has uncovered
the vital role of brain’s cognitive limits in social media
interactions.
These cognitive limits are what differentiates the
spread of information from the spread of a virus, and
they must be accounted for in models of information dif-
fusion. Specifically, in order to spread some information
on social media, a person first has to discover it in his
or her social feed. Discovery depends sensitively on how
the web site arranges the feed, the flux of incoming in-
formation, and the effort the person is willing and able
to expend on the discovery process. Moreover, as people
add more friends, the volume of information they receive
7may grow superlinearly due to the friendship paradox
in social networks [43] and its generalizations [44, 45]:
a person’s friends are more active and post more mes-
sages on average, then the person himself or herself does.
As a result, the volume of information may inevitably
exceed an individual’s cognitive capacity, creating con-
ditions for information overload [30]. To deal with in-
formation overload, people rely on cognitive heuristics
to focus only on salient information. In the context of
social media, this means paying attention to the most
recent messages at the top of their feed, and ignoring the
rest. This reduces the probability that highly connected
people will see and spread any given piece of information
in their feed, making them less susceptible to becoming
“infected.” The reduced susceptibility of central users
suppresses the spread of social contagions in social me-
dia. Accounting for these phenomena in models of in-
formation diffusion allows us to more accurately predict
how far information will spread online.
The interplay between networks and human cognitive
limits may have other non-trivial consequences. Poten-
tially, people who have higher capacity to process infor-
mation may put themselves in network positions allowing
them greater access to information [40, 46], which they
may then leverage for personal gain [47, 48]. Understand-
ing the role of social networks and cognitive heuristics
and biases in individual and collective behavior remains
an open research area.
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